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Abstract 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is real time reliability known to improve computing systems. This paper presents an approach 
towards the implementation of a fault tolerant FPGA based technique. Proposed scheme allows the diagnosis of transient and 
permanent fault affecting systems. This technique allows to easily identify whether a fault affects one of the replicated modules or 
the technique itself and whether such a fault is permanent or transient. The scheme can effectively recover computing systems from 
single transient fault w/o introducing any re-computing delay; hence, it is suitable for real time applications. Time taken for 
identification of the fault and recovery is less than 8ns. FPGA based fault injection experiment reveal that, the error detection and 
recovery coverage of 100% and 90% in the presence of single and two faulty models, respectively. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICCCV 2016. 
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1. Introduction  
At present, the use of embedded systems in safety - critical application such as, aviance, process control and patient 
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life supporting monitoring has become a common trend. Fault and error safety critical systems has a timing constraint 
and fault tolerant requirement [1, 2]. Electronic systems, especially those based on FPGA (Field Programmable Gate 
Array), are prostrate to fault due to many factors, like operations in harsh environment as encountered in space or 
nuclear applications [5]. Increasing complexity of these applications puts up ever stronger demands on the performance 
and reliability of the used system. To meet the reliability requirement, such embedded system should be equipped 
with appropriate error detection and meeting the timing constraint limitation are (negative coefficient) conflicting 
objectives. The reliability improvement may have negative impact on timing constraints. For Example Rollback 
Recovery [15, 16]. 
For safety critical application, without considering its real constraint, enhancing the reliability is not justifiable. 
Hence, for stipulating, Fault tolerant techniques with minimum performance overhead is embedded processor is of 
















Fig. 1. TMR Block System 
Modular Redundancy is the most popular approach to achieve the reliability and the timing constraints [4]. Modular 
Redundancy employs multiples replicas of the same module. Error occurring at the replicated modules. One of the 
approach to provide fault tolerance in real time systems is through redundancy, such as N- modular redundancy (NMR) 
or duplex pair. An NMR system replicates a computing source into parallel running N- module and uses voter to mask 
errors at output. Hence, for NMR it is possible to successfully tolerate the fault as long as it happens in no more than 
(N/2) modules. In duplex pair system it uses two pair of duplicated modules (duplexes), which are four in total [6, 3]. 
The duplication of modules is for error detection purpose and duplex as used in pair so that when an error is detected 
in one of the duplex module the output from the other module will be selected as output of the system could still cont. 
producing current data. Though NMR and Duplex pairs can enhance reliability of system, only effective for short 
mission time unless repair is possible. 
One of the widely used and commonly known used fault tolerant modular redundancy technique is triple modular 
redundancy. Traditional TMR system consisting of three redundant module voter at the modules output has some 
short coming which should be addressed in order to be implied in safety critical application .One of the major 
(disadvantage) short coming of the traditional TMR is its inability to cope with TMR failures. TMR failure is with the 
reference to the failure in TMR system causes by multiple fault in modules or for faulty voter. In roll back recovery 
system operation is block up to some points in its performance when an error occur and is detected during operation, 
the system will restore in its back to the previous check point and recomputed the system using TMR for recovery [16, 
17].However time overhead is introduce due to re-computation. Another way to obtain correct states is real-forward 
recovery, which is used in duplex system. It copies correct states from the fault free redundant modules or a spare to 
the faulty modules to avoid re-computation. However duplex system with spare are unable to provide sufficient 
redundancy. A quadreplex (duplex pair) system provide enough redundancy so that no single fault will receive re-
computation. However, draw in quad duplex system is its high cost. As while state in the faulty module are being 
restored, during that time other fault free modules are still operational [6, 9]. IT is suitable for and used in quradeplex 
system but may not be suitable and used in TMR system. Reason behind it is that quradeplex system will work properly 
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In this paper, we present new approach to provide fault tolerance and recovery system which is known as Fault 
recoverable Triple Modular Redundancy (FRTMR). This recovery scheme uses roll forward approach to avoid re-
computation and to meet strict transaction deadlines which addressed the short coming of traditional TMR [6]. The 
proposal technique called FRTMR has the ability to locate and remove latent fault using TMR modules as well as to 
recover the system from multiple fault. The concept and idea behind FRTMR is to reuse the available scan chains 
devoted specially for testability purpose. In order to compare the internal state of TMR modules to locate and restore 
the faulty states of faulty modules [1]. It is very suitable for real time application by synchronizing the three modules 
during recovery error masking is always preserved during computation. 
The FRTMR technique has been analytically and experimentally evaluated and compared with the state of the art 
technique. As a core study the proposed technique has been implemented on cyclone III FPGA. The proposed 
analytical study shows that in the presence of multiple errors, FRTMR improves the reliability of TMR system. In 
addition to that the result are taken by injecting the fault in FPGA, The result of FPGA fault injection experiments 
demonstrate that FRTMR can detect and correct 100% and 90% of  multiple fault effecting signal or double 
module[18,19,20].  
 
2. Related Work  
Consider sequential consisting of combinational and storage elements for computing module. As computing 
process in the computing module is real time task, it has to be finished with a deadline. In traditional TMR, only one 
faulty module is masked. Additional to that, the faulty module cannot be recovered in the traditional TMR as it cannot 
identified the faulty module. The technique prepared in the modified version of the voter to diagnose the faulty module 
[1, 5-8, 13]. Many prepared techniques uses hardware boned voter system, while some technique uses software boned 
method for voting and fault diagnose which some in the improper working, as the number of transient fault stores in 
the memory exceed the predefine values it treats that transient fault as the permanent fault [16, 18].  
The use of high-performance COTS chips in spaceships, on the other hand, increases concerns about system 
reliability. This is due to high probabilities of transient faults as well as intermittent and permanent faults in these 
chips. A transient fault is caused by ionizing radiation, particle strike, or other external interference. The induced error 
can propagate and corrupt a software state but does not cause permanent damage to the hardware. In an experiment 
[9], injecting 50 MeV protons to three COTS devices caused data loss and device crash, but no symptom was observed 
that implied permanent damage of the devices (e.g., a high current condition). This type of faults is usually 
characterized as lasting up to one clock cycle. With the scaling of manufacturing technology, transients last longer 
because there is less space for the particle strike energy to dissipate. In current technology, transients can last up to 
two clock cycles or even longer [15, 8]. If scaling continues, there is a high chance this duration will become longer. An 
intermittent fault has a duration that ranges between a few to billions of clock cycles [11, 9]. This fault is caused by 
various physical characteristics of chips (e.g., irregularities in chip voltage and temperature). Transistors become more 
and more susceptible to such physical characteristics with the scaling of manufacturing technology and the integration 
of many transistors into a chip (e.g., for multi-cores and large caches). A permanent fault occurs as a result of a 
manufacturing defect or excessive use of transistors. Such excessive use degrades the reliability of transistor materials. 
This fault become like a long duration intermittent fault, but it permanently compromises the functionality of the 
transistors. Both intermittent and permanent faults are more common in high-density chips because of their high 
utilization and low operating voltage [10]. 
One of the effective ways of synthesizing a reliable computer system from unreliable COTS components is Triple 
modular redundancy (TMR). TMR can be implemented in software without a major modification in the COTS 
components. For example, N identical copies of the same program can be run, with each copy executing on a separate 
computing module. Here, the time between two consecutive voting operations is generally longer than it is in 
hardware-implemented TMR. In order to reduce the voting interval time, software TMR can not only use the final 
program output data but also the intermediate program states as voting data. Intermediate states include large size data 
(e.g., vector or matrix of floating-point data). This makes hardware TMR voter unsuitable for software TMR systems. 
3. TMR Assembly 
The TMR Assembly is composed of three processors (here dummy) with voters on all outputs.  A voter is 
constructed by some simple logic gates and is able to find an error when inputs are not consistent. TMR design does 
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not have to deal with too many errors per unit time. The assumption of the TMR design is that we will not see identical 
errors on two processors at the same time. The voters pass the majority vote so, if the errors are identical, they will 
not be detected (and will, in fact, be turned into truth.) 
3.1 One and Multi Bit Voter 
       The CFTP is designed to be fault tolerant by software. Its circuit needs to be able to detect an error by itself. In 
order to achieve that, the concept of a voter is generated. The function of a 1-bit voter has been introduced in 
Lashomb’s thesis. This section reviews the basic concepts and then starts constructing the TMR Assembly. Figure 2 
shows what a 1-bit voter looks like. It is a simple circuit consisting of only AND and OR gates [7]. 
    AND2 
 
  OR3 






Fig. 2. 1-Bit Voter 
The voter function is more obvious in the truth table shown in Table 1(a). This voter always selects the majority of 
identical bits as its output bit. If two or more inputs are incorrect, the voter output will also be incorrect. The ability 
to detect and correct two or more errors in a voter is not vital for a system (e.g., the CFTP). 
         Table 1. (a) 1-Bit Voter Output (b) 1 Bit Voter with ERR Output. 
       a             b 
 
Assuming a single error, the output is always correct, but we cannot tell if there has been an error just by looking 
at this output. Therefore, some extra gates are added to report the occurrence of an error. Figure 2 shows a voter with 
error detection and Table 1(b) is its truth table. The error detection, ERR, is 1 when one of the inputs is not identical 
A B C Y  A B C Y ERR 
0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0  0 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0  0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1  0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1  1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1  1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0 
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with the rest. When the CFTP is in space, it is possible to have an SEU on the voter itself. A bit flip may cause the 
voter output to be incorrect. Say the second column of Table 1(b) has a bit flipping on A. This flipping makes 1 become 
the majority bit and output Y will give a 1 not a 0. Since a voter is used to catch and correct an error, it is not pleasant 
if it has an error itself. Thus, some reliability is needed for the voter [10, 12, 14].  
 Table 2. Majority Voter Output 
 
3.2 Design Flow: 
x Requirement Specification 
x Functional Specification 
x Block Diagram Designing 
x Algorithm formulization 
x Implementation of code in Verilog 
x Simulation of the program 
4. Simulations And Results 
4.1 Compilation 
        
      All components generated for TMR design were simulated. Compilation of code generated for function is 
successful. Total logical element used is 25. Compilation is done for error correction as well as error detection code 
and it is successful 
 
4.1.1 Analysis and Synthesis 
Elapsed time required for Analysis and Synthesis is 0.5s and average processor used is 1, it uses 197MB virtual 
memory. Filter takes 0.17s and uses 1 processor, uses 272MB of virtual memory. Assembler takes 0.8s and uses 1 
processor utilizing 211MB of virtual memory. All the details are shown in following Figure.   
4.1.2 Simulation and Results 
For one error in the input the simulation is done. The Change in Difference (CID) i.e. CID_0 is 0 and CID_1 is 1. 
Which show that the error is in input A. The 3rd bit of CID_1 is 1 which shows that the 3rd bit of input A is Faulty. 
A B C V_ERR Y D_ERR CID_0 CID_1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
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Fig. 3. (a) Output for two errors (b) Analysis and Synthesis 
The Fault correction system detects that fault and assigns the corrected bit to faulty bit and corrected output is provided 
for working.    
For two error in the input the simulation is done. The Change in Difference (CID) i.e. CID_0 is 0 and CID_1 is 1. 
Which show that the error is in input A. The 2nd and 4th bit of CID_1 is 1 which shows that the 2nd and 4th bit of input 
A is Faulty. The Fault correction system detects that fault and assigns the corrected bit to faulty bit and corrected 
output is provided for working.   
 
       Table 4. Flow Elapsed Time 
 
a b 
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Fig. 4.  (a) Output for Single error (b) Output for Single error with error corrector 
For two errors in different input the simulation is done. The Change in Difference (CID) i.e. CID_0 is 0 and CID_1 
is 1. Which show that the error is in input B. And CID-0 is 1 and CID_1 is 0 which shows that error is in input A. The 
3rd bit of CID_0 is 1 which shows that the 3rd bit of input A is Faulty. The 3rd bit of CID_1 is 1 which shows that the 
3rd bit of input B is Faulty. The Fault correction system detects that fault and assigns the corrected bit to faulty bit and 
corrected output is provided for working. 
4.3. Time Require in Detection and Correction Using TMR 
Time requires for correction and detection is shown in table. As compared to Cyclone II FPGA kit the time requires 
for execution the program is half on Cyclone III FPGA kit. The program is tested for different combinations of the 
inputs and errors. The result obtained by these testing are shown below. All time is in ‘ns’( Nano second) 
   
          Table 3. Time Require in Detection and Correction Using TMR 
 Cyclone III  (DE0) Cyclone II (DE2-70) 
NO. of Fault/s 1 2 1 2 
  Same Different  Same Different 
Detection Delay Time 4.56 4.67 4.73 10.44 10.38 12.83 
Corrected Output Delay Time 5.18 5.08 5.15 10.79 10.73 10.91 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
A failure in mission-critical system is either catastrophic or expensive to fix. In order to analyse the reliability of 
such systems, we have built a co-designed fault injector that can accurately emulate variable-duration faults in 
hardware. Our fault injection experiment using this tool showed two types of reliability problems in software-based 
a b 
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voters (i.e., used in N-modular redundancy). One software technique was designed to detect and tolerate long duration 
faults. The evaluation results showed that the presented system reduces the execution time of error detectors to 4.56ns 
and their code size by 56%, and removes the identified time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) vulnerability 
windows and can recover under transient and long duration faults. These high error detection and recovery coverage 
and low overheads in TMR-based systems are due to the design of software-based fault tolerance techniques by using 
fault injection data. 
 
6. Future Work 
 
In the future, focus will be on error detection in all the inputs at a same time. As in recent technique this facility is 
not available. By detecting and correcting the errors from all the three input and more important at the same bit gives 
accurate system. This system then after never requires any maintenance and it works for long period of time.  Fault 
Detection and Correction System searches the state space of the system until it either finds an undetected error or 
exhausts the state space. This search is automatic in the sense that it does not require user guidance once the system 
has been modeled. However, focus will only on the write operation between then processor and the memory. In order 
to simplify the process description, the read operation that the processor reads data from the memory is not considered. 
In general, it is just an early work. In the future, work will be to investigate the read operation and apply the method 
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